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Abst rac t - - ln  this paper, we present two ways to study the existence of weight Nash-equilibria 
and Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games. One is the 'fixed-point method' which is well known; 
and the second is the application of 'Ky Fan minimax inequality', which is not often used in the 
study of optimization, game theory, and mathematical programming. As results, several existence 
theorems for weight Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria are established which improve and unify 
the corresponding results in the recently existing literatures. 
Keywords--Mult iobjective game, Weight Nash-equilibrium, Pareto equilibria, Fixed point, Ky  
Fan minimax inequality. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the study of the existence of Pareto equilibria in game theory with vector payoffs has 
been attracted by many authors, for example, see [1-7] and references therein. The motivation 
for the study of multicriteria models can be found in [1,3,7]. As the existence of Pareto equilibria 
is one of the fundamental problem in the game theory. It is our purpose in this paper to present 
some existence results of Pareto equilibria by both fixed point and Ky Fan minimax inequality 
approach. As the existence problem of Paxeto equilibria can be formulated into the model in 
which solutions correspond to either fixed points of some kinds of set-valued mappings or Ky Fan 
type minimax inequality, thus both fixed-point method and Ky Fan minimax inequality method 
provide an unified study for the existence of Pareto equilibria problems in multiobjective games 
under weak hypotheses. Our results in this paper could be regarded as an unified improvement 
of corresponding existence results of Pareto equilibria given in the currently existing literatures. 
Now we recall and introduce some notations" and definitions. In this paper, we shall consider 
a finite-players game with multicriteria in its strategic form (also called a normal form) G := 
(X~,Fi)i~N, where N := {1,2,... ,n}. For each i 6 N, Xi is the set of strategies in R k' for 
the player i; and each F ~ is a mapping from X := II~eNXi into R k', which is called the payoff 
*Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed. 
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function (or say, multicriteria) of the i's player, here ki is a positive integer. If a choice x := 
(x l ,x2 , . . . , x  ") • X is played, each player i is trying to get his/her payoff function F ~ := 
( f~(x), f~(x), . .  i X • , f~  ( ) ) ,  which consists of noncommensurable outcomes. Each player i has a 
preference '~'  over the outcome space R a~. For each player i • N, its preference '~'  is given as 
follows: 
z 1 >'i z 2, if and only if z 1 > z~, 
1 1 Z 2 2 2 for each j = 1, 2,.. , k~, where z I := (Zl, z2, z~,) and . . . .  , = (z 1, z2, . . . ,  z~,) are any elements 
in R k~. The players' preference relations induce the preferences on X, defined for each player i; 
and chooses x = (x l , . . . ,  x '~) and y = (y l , . . . ,  y,)  • X by 
x ~i y, whenever Fi(x) ~_~ F~(y). 
Also we assume that the model of a game in this paper is a noncooperative game, i.e., there is 
no replay communicating between players and so players act as free agents, each play is trying 
to maximize his/her own payoff according to his/her preferences. 
For the games with vector payoff unctions (or say, multicriteria), as it is well known that in 
general there does not exist a strategy ~ • X to minimize (or equivalently to say, maximize) 
all f~s for each player, for example, see the reference of Yu in [6]. Hence, we need to recall some 
solution concepts for multicriteria games. Throughout this paper, for each given m • N, we shall 
denote by R~' the nonnegative orthant of R m, i.e., 
R~ := {u := (u l , . . . ,u  m) • R m such that u j > 0, for j := 1 , . . . ,m},  
so that the nonnegative orthant R~ of R m has a nonempty interior with the topology induced in 
terms of convergence of vectors respect o the Euclidean metric. That is, 
int R~ := {u :=  (u l , . . . ,U  m) • Rm: U j > 0, for all j = 1 , . . . ,m}.  
For each i • N, denote X i := Hj~N\{i}X j. If x = (x l , . . . , x  ") • X,  we shall write x i = 
(x*,. . .  , x i - l , x i+ l , . . . , x " )  • X~. If x ~ • Xi and x i • X~, we shall use (xi, x i) to denote y = 
(yt . . . .  ,y") • X such that yi = x i and yi = x i. Let ~ := (~1 . . . .  ,~,)  • X. Now we have the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION 1. A strategy ~i • X~ of player i is said to be a Pareto e~eient strategy (respectively, 
a weak Pareto e~eient strategy) respect to ~ if there is no strategy # • X~ such that 
F '  (~) -  F '  (:~',x ¢) • Ha+ ~\ {0} (respectively, F ~ (~) -  F '  (~',x') • int R~j) . 
DEFINITION 2. A strategy ~ 6 X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a weak Pareto 
equilibrium) of a game G := (X~, Fi)~eN if, for eaeh player i, ~c ~ 6 X~ is a Pareto efficient strategy 
against ~ (respectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy against ~c). 
From the above definition, it is clear that each Pareto equilibria is a weak Pareto equilibrium, 
but the converse is not always true. We also need the following definition which was first given 
by Wang in [5]. 
DEFINITION 3. A strategy ~6 X is said to be a weight Nash-equilibrium respect o weight vector 
W := (W1, . . .  ,W")  of a game G = (Xi ,F~)~N if for each player i e N, we have that 
(1) W' • R~ \ {0}; and 
(2) W ~ . F~(~) < W ~ . F~(~,x  ~) for each # • Xi, where '. ' denotes the inner production. 
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REMARK 1. In particular, when W i E T k~ for all i E N, the strategy ~ E X is said to be a +,  
normalized weight Nash-equilibrium respect o W, where T+ k~ is a simplex of R k', i.e., 
J • u k') R~:  such that =1}.  
Let W i E R~_ ~ \ {0} be fixed for each i E N. From the definition above, it is not difficult to 
verify that a strategy ~ E X is a weight Nash-equilibrium respect o the weight vector W -- 
(W1, . . . ,  W n) of a game (Xi, Fi)iEN, if and only if for each i E N, ~i is an optimal solution of 
the following optimization problem: 
minimize W i . F i (~,  x~) . (P(i, W~)) 
xiEX~ 
2. THE EX ISTENCE OF WEIGHT NASH-EQUIL IBR IA  
In order to study the existence of Pareto equilibria s applications of either fixed-point theorems 
or Ky Fan minimax inequality of Fan in [8], we shall first study the existence of weight Nash- 
equilibria as Pareto equilibria problems can be reduced to the study of weight Nash-equilibria 
under certain conditions. Now we discuss the existence of weight Nash-equilibria as applications 
of fixed points. 
2.1. The  F ixed-Po int  Approach 
For each i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n ,  W i E R~ ~ k {0} and x = (Xl,...,Xn), y = (y l , . . . , yn)  E X. Define 
two mappings SW : X x X ~ R and M W : X --* 2 x by 
i F ~ sw(x,y) := (x ,y 
and 
MW(x)  := {y* E X : SW (x,y*) = min SW(x ,y )}  
yEX 
for each (x, y) E X x X. Then following a simple fact which is Lemma 2.3 of Wang in [5] shows 
that the existence of weight Nash-equilibria is equivalently to the existence of fixed points for 
the mapping M W defined above, so that it enables us to study the weight Nash-equilibria by 
fixed-point theorems. 
LEMMA 1. Let G = (Xi, F~)ieN be a given multiobjective game. Suppose W ~ E Rk+ ~ \ {0) for 
each i E N. A strategy ~ E X is a weight Nash-equilibrium with the weight W = (W1, . . . ,  W n) 
of the game G, ff and only if ~ is a fixed point of the mapping M W defined above. 
PROOf• See Lemma 2.3 of Wang in [5]. | 
For the convenience of our discussion in this section, we now recall following two fixed-point 
theorems; mainly, Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem (see [9,10]) and Fan-Browder fixed-point 
theorem by Fan [11] and Browder [12], and we state them as Theorems A and B, respectively, 
below. 
THEOREM A. (See [9,10].) Let X be a nonempty compact and convex subset of a Hausdorlf 
locally convex topological vector space E, and F : X ~ 2 x is an upper semicontinuous set- 
valued mapping with nonempty closed and convex values. Then F has at least one fixed point, 
i.e., there exists ~ E X such that ~ E F(~). 
THEOREM B. (See [11,12].) Let X be a nonempty compact and convex subset of a Hausdor/ir 
topological vector space E. Suppose a set-valued mapping F : X -* 2 x has the [ollowiag 
properties: 
(1) F(x)  is nonempty and convex for each x E X;  and 
(2) F has open inverse valued, i.e., F - l (y )  = {x E X : y E F(x)}, [or each y E X is open 
inX .  
Then F has at /east  one fixed point. 
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We would like to note that the present form of Theorem B was first given by Browder in [12]. 
However, the equivalent geometric form of Theorem B was also presented by Fan in [11] as an 
application of the classical KKM principle in [13]. Thus, this fixed point is now shared by both 
of their names. 
As an application of Theorem A, we first have the following. 
THEOREM 1. Let G = (Xi, Fi)iEN be a given multiobjective game. For each i E N, Xi  is a 
nonempty compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E~. 
I f  there is a weight vector W := (W1, . . . ,W n) with W ~ E R k~ \ {0} such that the function S w 
is joint]y continuous on X x X and ST(x ,  .) is quasi-convex on X for each fixed x E X, then the 
game G has at least one weight Nash-equilibrium respect o the weight vector W = ( W1, . . . , W n ). 
PROOF. In order to apply Theorem A, it suffices to show that the mapping M w defined above 
is upper semicontinuous with nonempty convex and closed values. Note that X is compact, 
S w : X x X ~ R is jointly continuous, and sw(x ,  .) is quasi-convex for each fixed x E X. Thus, 
the set MW(x)  is nonempty, closed, and convex for each fixed x E X. By Proposition 23 of 
Aubin and Ekeland [14, p. 120], it follows that the mapping M w : X --* 2 x defined by 
MW(x)  := {y* E X : SW (x,y*) = min SW(x ,y )}  
yEX 
for each x E X is upper semicontinuous. Now by Theorem A, the mapping M W has a fixed point 
E X. From Lemma 1, it follows that ~ is a weight Nash-equilibrium of the game (X~, F~)ieN 
respect o weight vector W, thus we complete the proof. I 
Theorem 1 shows that the corresponding Theorem 3.1 of Wang in [5] for the multiobjective 
game G = (Xi, F i) still holds when underlying space Ei is a locally convex Hausdorff topological 
vector space instead of being a normed space. Indeed, as an application of Theorem B, we shall 
see that the hypotheses ofTheorem 1 can be further weaken to guarantee the existence of weight 
Nash-equilibria even underlying space Ei is only a Hausdorff topological vector space without 
convex structure. Before we present his general result, we need the following fact. 
LEMMA 2. Let X and Y be two Hausdorff topological spaces and X be compact. Suppose 
f : X x Y --* R is a real-valued function such that 
(1) f is upper semicontinuous on X x Y; and 
(2) for each fixed x E X,  the mapping y ~ f (x ,y )  is lower semicontinuous on Y. 
Then the function ¢ : Y --* R defined by ¢(y) = maxuEx f(u, y) is continuous on Y. 
PROOF. As X is compact, ¢ is upper semicontinuous on Y by (1) and Theorem 1 of Aubin [15, 
p. 67]. By the Condition (2), ¢ is also lower semicontinuous on Y. I 
We now have the following existence theorem for the weight Nash-equilibria. 
THEOREM 2. Let G = (Xi, Fi)iEN be a given multiobjective game. For each i E N, Xi is a 
nonempty compact and convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E~. If there is a 
weight vector W = (W1, . . . ,  W '~) with W i E R~ \ {0) such that the following are satisfied for 
each i E N: 
(1) the function (x, y) ~ W ~ . Fi(x ~, yi) is jointly lower semicontinuous on X x X;  
(2) for each fixed y E X,  the mapping x ~-* W ~. Fi(x ~, yi) is upper semicontinuous on X; and 
(3) for each fixed x E X,  W ~ . F~(x~,y ~) is quasi-convex on X.  
Then G has at least one weight Nash-equilibrium respect o the weight vector W. 
PROOF. For each k E N, define a set-valued mapping Ak : X --. 2 x by 
1} 
Ak(x):=H,ffi I y ieX , :W i . F  i (x  ~,yi) < min W' .F  ~(x * ,u ' )+~ , 
u~EX~ 
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for each x 6 X. Then Ak (x) is nonempty and convex by the Condition (3) for each x • X. Note 
that A-~*(y) := N~=,{x • X : W i • Fi(x~,yi) < minu, Ex, W i • Fi(x~,u i) + l /k}, which is open 
in X by Conditions (1) and (2), for each y • X. Thus, Fan-Browder fixed-point Theorem B 
implies that the mapping Ak has a fixed point x(k). From the definition of Ak, it follows that 
1 
W i .F '  (xi(k),xi(k)) < min W i. F i (x~(k),u i) + ~. 
u~EXi  
Without loss of the generality, we may assume that x(k) -~ ~ • X as X is compact. By the 
Condition (1) and Lemma 2, we have that 
W' .F  ~ (&i&i) < inf W i. F ~ (x~(k),xi(k)) < inf min W ~. F i (xi(k),u i) 
- -  k - -*oo - -  k - -*oo u ,EX ,  
= min W i . F  ~(~,u i ) .  
u ~ 6X~ 
Thus, ~ is a weight Nash-equilibrium of G respect to the weight vector W given above, and we 
complete the proof. | 
It is clear that Theorem 2 includes Theorem 1 as a special case of the continuity and convexity 
of the mapping S W in Theorem 1, automatically satisfy corresponding Conditions (1)-(3) of 
Theorem 2, however the converse does not hold. 
So far, we have given two existence results of weight Nash-equilibria as applications of fixed- 
point theorems. In what follows, as an application of Ky Fan minimax inequality, we shall give 
another existence result for weight Nash-equilibria which is different from both Theorems 1 and 2 
above. 
2.2. Ky  Fan Min imax Method 
Now we first recall and state the well-known Ky Fan minimax inequality of Fan [8] in nonlinear 
analysis as the following form. 
THEOREM C. KY FAN MINIMAX INEQUALITY. Let X be a nonempty compact and convex set 
in a Hausdorff topological vector space. Let f be real-valued function defined on X x X such 
that 
(1) for each fixed x 6 X,  f (x ,y )  is a lower semicontinuous function of y on X;  
(2) for each fixed y 6 X,  f (x ,y )  is a quasi-concave function of x on X.  
Then there exists Yo 6 X such that 
sup f (x,  Yo) <- sup f (x,  x). 
zEX x6X 
By applying Theorem C, we have the following. 
THEOREM 3. Let G = (Xi, Fi)~EN be a given multiobjective game and for each i 6 N, let Xi be 
a nonempty compact and convex subset of a HausdorfT topological vector space Ei. If there is a 
we/ght vector W = (W1,. . . , W n) with W i 6 Rk+ ~ \ {0} such that the following are satisfied: 
(1) for each fixed y E X, the mapping x ~-~ ~ieN W i . Fi ( x ~, yi ) is upper semicontinuous onX; 
(2) the mapping (x, y) ~-* ~ ieNW ~ " Fi(x ~, yi) is jointly lower semicontinuous on X x X;  
(3) for each fixed x E X, the mapping y ~-* ~iENW ~. Fi(x ~, y~) is quasi-convex. 
Then G has at least one weight Nash-equilibria. 
PROOF. Define a mapping ¢ : X x X ~ R by 
¢(x,y) := ~'~=1Wi. (F i (x~,x i) - F i (x i ,y i ) ) ,  
for each ( x, y) E X x X. Then we have that: 
(1) for each fixed y E X, x ~-* ¢(x, y) is lower semicontinuous; 
(2) for each fixed x E X, the mapping y ~ ¢(x, y) is quasi-concave; and 
(3) ¢(x, x) <_ 0, for all x 6 X. 
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By Ky Fan minimax inequality above, there exists & E X such that for each y E X, 
¢(x,y)  = ~'~=1 Wi"  (F  i (~ci,x i) - F'  (~c~,y')) < O. 
Let y -- (&~,yi) E X for i = 1,2,. . .  ,n, then we have W i • (F i (~,& ~) - Fi(&i, yi)) <_ O, which 
implies that 
W ~.F  i (:~,~i) = min W i.  F '  (~ ,u i ) .  
uiEXl 
Thus ~ is a weight Nash-equilibrium point of the game G respect o the weight vector W. I 
REMARK 2. We note that the both Condition (3) of Theorem 2 and the Condition (3) of The- 
orem 3 are independent to each other, and thus Theorems 2 and 3 could not contain each other 
as a special case. Moreover, Theorem 3 does not only improve corresponding existence results 
of weight Nash-equilibria for multiobjective games with multicriteria given by Wang [5, Theo- 
rem 3.1], but it also extends Theorem 1.11 of Szidarovszky et al. in [3] and Theorem 1 of Borm 
et al. in [16] to Hausdorff topological vector spaces under weaker continuous hypotheses. 
3. THE EX ISTENCE OF PARETO EQUILIBRIA 
In this section, as applications of weight Nash-equilibria, we shall derive some existence of 
Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games. In order to do so, we first need the following Lemma 
which tells us that the existence problem for Pareto equilibria can be reduced to the existence of 
the weight NasA-equilibria under certain circumstance. 
LEMMA 3. Each norma//zed weight Nash-equilibrium ]c E X with a weight W = (W1, . . . ,  W n) E 
T1 kl x .. .  × T2" (respectively, W = (w l , . . . ,W n) E intT+ k' x ..- x intT+ k')  is a weak Paxeto 
equilibrium (respectively, a Pareto equilibrium) of the game (X~, F~)ieg. 
PROOF. It is Lemma 2.1 of Wang in [5, pp. 376,377]. I 
REMARK 3. We should note that the conclusion of the above Lemma 3 still hold, if ~ is a weight 
Nash-equilibrium with a weight W = (W1, . . .  ,W n) satisfying that W i E R~_ ~ (respectively, 
W i E intR k~) for each i E N. Second, we note that a Pareto equilibria is not necessarily a 
weight Nash-equilibrium. 
Now by combing Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, we have the following existence of Pareto equilibria 
for multiobjective games in Hausdorff topological vector spaces. 
THEOREM 4. Let G = (Xi, F i ) ieg be a multiobjective game. For each i E N,  X i  is a nonempty 
compact and convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E~. I f  there is a weight 
combination W = (W1, . . . , W n) with W ~ E Rk+ ~ \ {0} such that the following are satisfied for 
each i E N: 
(1) the function (x,y) ~-* W ~ . Fi(x~,y ~) is jointly lower semicontinuous on X x X ;  
(2) for each ~ed y E X ,  the mapping x ~ W i. Fi(x~,y ~) is upper semicontinuous on X ;  and 
(3) for each fixed x E X ,  W i • F~(x ~, y~) is quasi-convex on X .  
Then G has at least one weak Pareto equilibrium. Furthermore, if  W ~ E intT~ ~, for all i = 
i,. n, then the game G . i n . . ,  = (X~, F )i=1 has at  least one Pareto equflibriurn. 
PROOF. By Theorem 2, G has at least one weight Nash-equilibrium & respect o the weight 
vector W. Now Lemma 3 shows that & is also a weak Pareto equilibrium of G, and thus the 
conclusion follows. I 
By the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 4, as a consequence of Theorem 3 instead 
of Theorem 2, we have the following Pareto equilibrium theorem. 
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THEOREM 5. Let G = (Xi, Fi)iEN be a multiobjective game. For each i E N,  suppose Xi  is a 
nonempty compact and convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space Ei. H there is a 
weight vector W = (W1, . . . ,  W n) with W ~ E R~ \ {0} such that the following are satisfied: 
(1) for each Fixed y E X ,  the mapping x ~-* ~ie ;v W i. Fi( x~,y ~ ) is upper semicontinuous onX;  
(2) the mapping (x, y) ~-* ]E~eNW ~ . F~(x~,y i) is jointly lower semicontinuous on X x X ;  
(3) for each fixed x E X ,  the mapping y ~ ~ieNW ~ • F~(x ~, yi) is quasi-convex. 
Then G has at least one weak Pareto equilibrium. In additional, if W ~ E intT~2 for each 
i = 1 , . . . ,  n, then G has at least one Pareto equilibrium. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 5, we have the following. 
THEOREM 6. Let G = (X~, F~)~eN be a multiobjective game. For each i E N, suppose Xi  is a 
nonempty compact and convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E~ and the following 
conditions are satisfied for j = 1, . . . ,  ki: 
(1) the ]j is jointly lower sernicontinuous on X;  
(2) for each fixed yi E Xi, the funct ion/ j (x  ~, yi) is upper semicontinuous on X~; and 
(3) for each fixed x ~ E X ~, the function ] j(x ~, .) is convex on Xi. 
Then the multiobjective game G has at least one Pareto equilibrium. 
PROOF. Taking any fixed weight vector W = (W 1, ... ,Wn), where W i E intT~_ ~ for each 
i = 1, . . . ,  n. By the Conditions (1)-(3), it follows that all hypotheses of Theorem 5 are satisfied. 
Thus G has at least one weight Nash-equilibrium ~ respect o the weight vector W. As W i E int 
for each i E N, ~ must be a Pareto equilibrium point of G and we complete the proof. | 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we study the existence of weight Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria as appli- 
cations of nonlinear analysis, mainly, fixed-point theorems and Ky Fan minimax inequalities. It 
is well known that fixed-point method has a wide application in the study of economics, optimiza- 
tion, and mathematical programming, for example, see [17] and other references cited therein. 
On the other hand, though Ky Fan minimax inequality plays a very important role in the study 
of nonlinear analysis, and it is even regarded as one of the most important principles in non- 
linear analysis, for instance, see [14,15,18]. However, to the best acknowledge of both authors, 
not enough attention has been put on the study of optimization, game theory, and mathematical 
programming by using Ky Fan minimax inequality. It is our purpose in this paper to present how 
Ky Fan type minimax inequality can be applied to study the existence of weight Nash-equilibria 
and Pareto equilibria. Hopefully and surely, the Ky Fan minimax inequality method would also 
play another important role in the study of optimization, in particular for the investigation of 
the existence for Pareto equilibria in the vector-valued optimization problems and multiobjective 
game. Indeed, some progresses in this direction have been archived in our joint papers [19,20]. 
Also we shall consider the numerical aspects of weight Nash-equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium 
points for multiobjective games in our coming study soon by the computation method for fixed- 
points which has been established and used successfully in the computation of mathematical 
economics and optimization problems in last three decades, e.g., see [16] and references therein. 
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